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The traditional model of taste discrimination in labor markets presumes perfect substitution, 
making it unsuitable for the measurement of discrimination across job assignments. We 
extend the model to explain cross-assignment discrimination and test it on data from Major 
League Baseball. A competitive firm with a Generalized Leontief production function fills each 
job assignment with whites and nonwhites in an environment of customer prejudice. 
According to the model, cross-assignment discrimination depends upon racial productivity 
differences, the productivity x prejudice interaction, technology, relative labor supply and 
racial integration. We find strong evidence of ceteris paribus racial salary differences 
between hitters and pitchers. 
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       Discrimination is defined as the unequal treatment of equals. In the labor market “equals” implies 
that minority and majority workers are perfect substitutes and “unequal treatment” implies that, despite 
the absence of productivity differences, members of the minority group are valued differently from 
members of the majority group. In the traditional theory of racial discrimination in the labor market, due 
originally to Becker (1971) and Arrow (1973), whites and nonwhites are perfect substitutes and it is 
shown that prejudice can result in unequal labor market outcomes. Despite this model’s presumption of 
perfect substitution and the many tests of it
1, white and nonwhite labor groups are actually not perfectly 
substitutable. Grant and Hamermesh (1981) found that black adults are imperfect substitutes for white 
men and complements to white women and youths. Borjas (1983) provided evidence showing that black 
male workers are imperfect substitutes for white male workers, but Hispanic and white male workers are 
complementary. Borjas (1987) showed that black natives are imperfect substitutes for white natives and 
Kahanec (2006) used U.S. census data to confirm that nonwhite labor is complementary to white labor.  
     If whites and nonwhites are imperfectly substitutable, their human capital endowments must differ. 
But why?  Earlier literature only provides some hints. Welch (1967) argued that blacks and whites 
working in the same firm are unlikely to be perfect substitutes because, due to long term discrimination, 
blacks may acquire less schooling and attend lower quality schools. Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) 
argued that white and nonwhite professional basketball players could be imperfect substitutes because of 
differences in pre-NBA training and experience. Borjas (2008) suggested that black and white workers 
may not be perfect substitutes in a firm when there are anti-discrimination policies such as Affirmative 
Action in place.  
                                                 
1 See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature. 
  2     One crucial condition for perfect substitution is that blacks and whites be employed in the same job 
assignment in a firm: Since different assignments require different skills, workers in assignment A must 
be imperfect substitutes for workers in assignment B, despite both contributing to production of the 
same good. The traditional model is equipped to answer the question: Are whites and nonwhites within 
the same job assignment paid differently? For example, is there a ceteris paribus pay difference between 
white pilots (flight attendants) and non-white pilots (flight attendants)? But, the model cannot address 
the question of “cross-job” discrimination, e.g. are white flight attendants (pilots) ceteris paribus paid 
differently from nonwhite pilots (flight attendants), or are non-white doctors ceteris paribus paid 
differently from white nurses?  
     The measurement of cross-job discrimination is an unexplored area. The literature offers very little 
insight into how the structure of the production function influences the structure of discrimination. 
Furthermore, very little is known about what sorts of empirical specifications must be used when whites 
and nonwhites are imperfect substitutes. Failure to properly account for the structure of the production 
function will, as Hashimoto and Kochin (1980) would argue, ultimately lead to biased estimates of 
discrimination.   
     In this paper, we examine cross-job discrimination. We articulate a production function where jobs 
are distinct inputs and extend Becker’s (1971) Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC) to measure the 
ceteris paribus racial pay gap across jobs. We find that discrimination varies in counterintuitive ways 
depending upon the production function and group differences in productivity and labor supply. We test 
the model with data from Major League Baseball (MLB) for the 1990s and we find strong evidence of 
ceteris paribus racial wage differences between hitters and pitchers.  
 
 
  3II.  A theory of cross-job discrimination 
 II.1 The problem setting      
     Suppose production requires the completion of Jobs 1 and 2. The successful completion of Job 1 
requires a different set of skills than what is required for the successful completion of Job 2. There are 
four inputs– white workers doing job 1 (2) and nonwhite workers doing job 1 (2). The firm assigns each 
worker to a particular job depending upon his/her observed skills and credentials. We allow for racial 
differences in productivity both within and across jobs.  We assume that white customers are prejudiced 
against nonwhite workers (nonwhite customers are color-blind), and the firm must assign nonwhite 
workers to jobs for which prejudiced white customers must see them produce. The labor market is 
perfectly competitive and product price is normalized at unity.     
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3 
Customer prejudice may be viewed as a situation where customers discount the marginal revenue 
product (MRP) of nonwhite workers. The lower is D, the more intense the prejudice and the lower is 
nonwhite MRP. If D equals 1, there is no prejudice. While it is traditional to think of customer 
discrimination as implying a price discount on the output of nonwhite workers, the approach above is 
equivalent; D reflects the idea that nonwhite input is valued less when customers are prejudiced 
compared to the case where customers are not prejudiced. Note also that production is constant returns 
 
2 See Diewert (1971) 
  4to scale and we restrict the values of the technology coefficients so that  = . The sign of a coefficient 
indicates whether inputs i and j are substitutes (
ij γ γ ji
ij γ < 0) or complements ( ij γ > 0). 
     Define  and  as the market prices of white input i and nonwhite input j, respectively. The firm’s 
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Compensation to workers in each race/job group depends upon four factors – the group’s productivity, 
customer prejudice, technology, and relative labor supplies. According to equation (4), for example, the 
wage paid to nonwhite workers doing job 1 depends upon: (i) the group’s productivity (reflected by 
 
3 Kahn (1991) used a similar approach to incorporate discrimination into a production function. 
  522 γ )
4; (ii) prejudice (D); (iii) the degrees of substitutability or complementarity between whites and 
nonwhites doing job 1 ( 12 γ ), nonwhites doing job 1 and whites doing job 2 ( 23 γ ), and nonwhites doing 
job 1 and nonwhites doing job 2 ( 24 γ ); and (iv) the numbers of nonwhite workers doing job 1 per white 
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     Becker’s  (1971)  Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC) measures the ceteris paribus racial 
earnings gap. For cross-assignment discrimination, the MDC for whites doing job 1 relative to 
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and for whites doing job 2 relative to nonwhites doing job 1 is   
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22
4 Note that γ22 is not the marginal productivity of this job/race group, but is correlated with it. If γ22 rises  (falls), the marginal 
productivity curve will shift up (down). For example, an increase in γ could result from a technological advance, an 
increase in the average human capital endowment of each worker, or some other exogenous change. 
  6According to equations (7) and (8), discrimination depends upon: (i) prejudice; and (ii) racial 
productivity differences within and across jobs; (iii) the degrees of substitutability or complementarity 
between whites and nonwhites within and across jobs; and (iv) the relative supplies of white and 
nonwhite labor within and across jobs.  
     Equations (7) and (8) yield important predictions: 


















(ii) If white workers in one job become more productive, discrimination against nonwhite workers in the 
other job  increases. 
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> 0. 
  7If there is an exogenous increase in the productivity of white workers doing job 1 ( 11 γ  rises) or white 
workers doing job 2 ( 33 γ  rises), white wages rise. According to equations (9) and (10), the white wage 
with prejudice (measured by the numerator in the left-hand ratio in equations (7) or (8)) will rise 
proportionately more than will the white wage in the absence of prejudice (measured by the numerator 
in the right-hand ratio in equations (7) and (8)). Regardless of the signs and magnitudes of the 
technology coefficients and the relative supplies of labor, discrimination rises.  For example, a 
technological advance that makes white workers doing one job more efficient results in greater 
discrimination against nonwhite workers performing the other job;   

















When nonwhite workers experience an increase in productivity, they benefit in two ways. First, their 
wage rises. Second, from equations (7) and (8), the productivity increase reduces the wage ratio with 
discrimination and without, but the left-hand wage ratio falls more than the right-hand ratio in either 
equation;  
(iv) Discrimination experienced by nonwhites in a job depends upon the racial compositions within and 
across both jobs. 
As an example, consider equation (7). The ceteris paribus racial pay gap between whites in job group 1 
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5 These predictions were obtained from simulations, available from the authors upon request.  
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). Compare these results with 
what would be predicted by the traditional model. In Becker (1971), an increase in the relative supply of 
nonwhites results in a greater ceteris paribus pay differential between whites and nonwhites. This is the 
simple result for an economy where whites and nonwhites are identical and there is effectively just one 
job. In our model, the relationship between discrimination and the relative supply of nonwhite labor is 
much more complicated. Not only does the amount of discrimination experienced by nonwhites in one 
job depend upon how many nonwhites there are in that job, but also on how many nonwhites there are in 
the other job. Furthermore, how dominant whites and nonwhites are in each job and how racially 
integrated one job is relative to another will influence the level of discrimination experienced by 
nonwhites in a job. This is all due to the production function, which dictates the interrelationships in 
production between the different labor groups. Note that we cannot sign the relationship between the 
MDC and any labor supply ratio without knowing the signs of the technology coefficients ( );  ij
(v) Prejudice and productivity interact in the determination of racial pay differences across job groups; 
the marginal effect of prejudice on pay depends upon whether whites and nonwhites are substitutes or 
























This implication is important because it suggests that in an empirical specification of cross-job 
discrimination, interaction terms between race and productivity must be included in order to avoid 
estimation bias. As an example of how prejudice and productivity interact in our model, note from 
equation (9) that the reduction in discrimination experienced by nonwhite workers in group 1 (relative to 
white workers in group 2) as a result of a productivity increase will be lower the greater is the degree of 
 
6 Proofs available upon request from the authors. 










                                                
< 0). Prejudice taxes the benefit nonwhites enjoy from being more 
productive and the tax is greater the greater is customer distaste for output made by nonwhite workers.  
                
III.  A Test Case: Major League Baseball During the 1990s 
III.1 Description of the test case 
In this section, we test a number of the implications of the model presented above. We focus on an 
industry where: (a) there are accurate data on salaries and productivity for individual workers across 
distinct job assignments and these data are available for different firms; (b) the productivities of job 
assignment groups within the firm are interrelated; (c) there is racial integration; and (d) there is 
potential for customer discrimination. One industry conveniently satisfying these criteria is Major 
League Baseball (MLB) in the USA.
7 In MLB, each team (firm) requires two distinctly complementary 
types of player skill – hitting (an offensive skill) and pitching (a defensive skill) - in the production of 
baseball entertainment. Pitchers have historically been disproportionately white, whereas the pool of 
hitters has tended to be more racially balanced.  
III. 2 Empirical Analysis 
To ascertain the level of discrimination across positions we need to control for a player’s MRP, that is, 
for his contribution to the team’s ticket, broadcasting and merchandise revenues. This is problematic on 
two accounts: First, the team production nature of baseball makes it is impossible to directly measure 
individual revenue contributions. We thus proxy MRP by various position-specific career statistics 
(computed on a game-by-game basis since the beginning of the player’s MLB career) that proxy ability 
 
7 Wage discrimination in professional sports has received considerable attention among labor economists because of the 
abundant statistical evidence on a player’s personal attributes, compensation and productivity. Most of the studies have 
focused on racial discrimination with respect to pay, hiring, retention and positional segregation. For a relatively recent 
examination of the research in this area, see Kahn’s [2000] expository survey. 
 10and skills. This leads us to our second problem, since different career statistics are commonly recorded 
for hitters and pitchers. To be sure, the career statistics commonly recorded for hitters are: At Bats, 
Stolen Bases,  Bases on Balls,  Total Bases,  Slugging Average and Batting Average. The statistics 
commonly recorded for pitchers are: Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, Saves, Homeruns, 
Walks, Strikeouts, Innings Pitched, Earned Run Average (ERA) and Strikeout Rate.
8 
To surmount this second hurdle, we adopt the following two-stage approach. We first assume 
that player productivity contains both an ‘on-field’ component and an ‘off-field’ component, and that 
these impact upon earnings as follows: 
(11)   









where  and   denote the salaries of hitters and pitchers respectively,  h w p w Χ
i , i = h, p, is a vector of 
(largely) position-specific ‘on-field’ productivity measures, Z is a vector of common ‘off-field’ 
productivity measures, and the B’s denote parameter vectors. Our aim is to derive an estimating 
equation of the form: 
(12)       wi = Β0
iΧ +Β1
iΖ
where i = h, p denotes hitters and pitchers and Χ denotes some common, ‘imputed’ measure of ‘on-
field’ productivity. We therefore estimate the following ‘first-stage’ regressions:  
(13)   







                                                 
8 A discussion of these and other baseball terms referred to in the paper may be found at any one of a number of websites, 
including www.baseball1.com and www.mlb.com.  
 11That is, we regress hitter and pitcher wages on only those variables that we presume affect a player’s on-




 include the relevant position-specific statistics described 
above as well as a player’s age, years of MLB experience and years of MLB-squared. We also include in 
the vector    dummy variables to identify those hitters who are ‘designated hitters’ as well as those 
who are ‘infielders’, ‘outfielder’ or ‘catchers’ when their team is fielding. 
Χ
We interpret predicted earnings, ( ) ˆˆ ˆ , hp ww w = , from regressions (13) as a position-independent, 
imputed measure of on-field productivity for both hitters and pitchers. We then estimate the following 
second-stage regression: 
(14)    01 ˆ
ii
i ww β =+ Β Z
                                                
The measures of on-field productivity we incorporate into Z include age, MLB experience and 
experience-squared, tenure with current club, whether the player plays in the American or National 
League, whether he is a member of a Canadian team, whether he is a free agent and whether he is 
subject to final offer arbitration.
9 We also include characteristics of the Greater Metropolitan area in 
which the player’s team is located (i.e. percentage of population that is white, black and Hispanic, 
average annual income and population).  
Our empirical analysis is set out in Tables 1-4 (Appendix). Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive 
statistics for hitters and pitchers, respectively. Our full sample includes 1093 hitters (549 White, 367 
Black and 177 Hispanic) and 1204 pitchers (942 White, 127 Black and 135 Hispanic). Salary, 
experience, performance and position data were drawn from the Lahman Baseball Database 
(www.baseball1.com) over four seasons - 1992, 1993, 1997 and 1998. The Major League expanded by 
 
9 In MLB, player salaries are set under two different regimes, one competitive, the other monopsonistic. The monopsonistic 
regime applies to players with fewer than six years of MLB experience. These players are subject to the reserve clause and 
are constrained to negotiate their pay with only one team. The competitive regime applies to players with at least 6 years of 
MLB experience. They are eligible to file for free agency and may negotiate with any team in the league. Monopsony power 
effectively begins to erode, however, as early as the fourth year because then a player is eligible for final offer arbitration. 
 12two teams between 1992 and 1993 and again by two teams between 1997 and 1998.  The salary data do 
not include information about contract length, bonus clauses or endorsements. Salaries for players on the 
Canadian teams were converted to U.S. dollars. The experience data were used to determine the player’s 
eligibility for free agency and final offer arbitration and the player’s race was inferred from inspection of 
Topps baseball cards for all four seasons. For the U.S. teams, metropolitan area population and per-
capita income were obtained from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov).  For 
the Canadian teams, similar data were obtained from the Statistics Canada website (www.statcan.ca). 
Per-capita income data for the Canadian cities were converted to U.S. dollars. 
  It is apparent from Table 1 that there are no major differences between the personal and 
professional characteristics of white, black and Hispanic hitters, nor in the characteristics of the greater 
metropolitan area in which they play. In terms of career characteristics, however, it is apparent that 
black hitters record significantly more At Bats, Stolen Bases, Bases on Balls and Total Basses than either 
white or Hispanic hitters. Whites record more At Bats and Bases on Balls but fewer Stolen Bases and 
Total Bases than Hispanics. Blacks are also significantly less likely than whites or Hispanics to play as 
an infielder, catcher or designated hitter. In Table 2, the domination of white pitchers is immediately 
apparent. It is evident that white pitchers are on average older than black and (especially) Hispanic 
pitchers, and that they also enjoy higher average earnings. In terms of career characteristics, white 
pitchers record significantly higher Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, Shutouts, Saves, 
Homeruns,  Walks,  Strikeouts and Innings Pitched than either blacks or Hispanics, with Hispanics 
recording generally lower figures than blacks. 
Table 3 reports second-stage regressions with white pitchers, black pitchers, Hispanic pitchers, 
white hitters, black hitters and Hispanic hitters defined as the default race-position category respectively. 
It is apparent from Table 3 that there are significant racial differences in earnings both within and across 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Arbitration rights tend to relieve players of monopsonistic exploitation because arbitrators strive to award competitive 
salaries. 
 13positions. Our estimated coefficients suggest that even after controlling for both on- and off-field 
productivity, the median annual earnings of white pitchers are 15.1 percent higher those of black 
pitchers, 11.1 percent higher than those of black hitters and 8.8 percent higher than those of Hispanic 
hitters. There is also some evidence of reverse discrimination with the median annual earnings of white 
hitters being 16.1 percent lower than those of Hispanic pitchers, Finally, in terms of the two minority 
groups, the median annual earnings of Hispanic pitchers are 15.6 per cent higher than those of Black 
pitchers and 11.8 percent (at the 90 percent level) higher than Black hitters. 
In Table 4 we explore our theoretical prior that wage discrimination across player job 
assignments interacts with productivity differences between white, black and Hispanic hitters and 
pitchers. We test this prediction by creating a Relative Productivity variable that equals the difference 
between a player’s individual productivity and the mean productivity of players in the other 
racial/position group multiplied by the player’s individual productivity. Thus, in Column (1) of Table 4, 
where we focus on white pitchers relative to black hitters, our Relative Productivity ( White 
Pitcher:Black Hitter) variable is defined as: Individual White Pitcher Productivity x (Individual White 
Pitcher Productivity - Mean Black Hitter Productivity), where productivity is estimated according to the 
two-stage process outlined in equations (11)-(14). 
  It would appear from Table 4 that wage discrimination is indeed affected by changes in relative 
productivities. Our theoretical prior is that discrimination against non-whites in a particular job 
assignment should increase as whites in the other job assignment become more productive. Our 
empirical results suggest that, as regards white pitchers and black hitters and white pitchers and Hispanic 
hitters, the opposite is the case, with the earnings of white pitchers relative to non-white hitters falling as 
the relative productivity of white pitchers increases.  
 
 
 14IV. Concluding  Remarks 
     In this study, we address a previously un-researched problem in the literature on taste discrimination 
in pay: Ascertaining the extent to which racial or gender differences in pay across job assignments are 
attributable to prejudice. Nearly all wage discrimination studies have focused on discrimination within 
the same job assignment, thus treating whites and nonwhites (or males and females) as perfect 
substitutes. We extend the theory to the case of discrimination across job assignments where 
assignments are viewed as distinct inputs. Our theoretical findings underscore the importance of 
carefully considering the production function when there are productivity differences between majority 
and minority workers. An important finding from our theoretical analysis is that the magnitude of racial 
productivity differences influences the amount of discrimination. Furthermore, when whites and 
nonwhites are interrelated in production, either within or across job assignments, race and productivity 
will interact. This is an important implication, for it means that whenever white and nonwhite workers 
have productivity differences, the researcher should include productivity x race interactions in any 
empirical specification. 
            We tested our model using data from Major League Baseball, an industry characterized by 
complementary job assignments, a history of racial integration and discrimination. We found convincing 
evidence of ceteris paribus racial differences in pay across player positions, even after controlling for a 
wide array of demographic variables and position-specific productivity. Moreover, we find strong 
evidence of our theoretical prior that racial pay differentials across assignments are affected by changes 
in relative productivities. A suggested next step in this research would be to ascertain the 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Hitters 
 All  White  Black  Hispanic 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev 
Personal Characteristics 
Log Annual Salary  13.890 1.13 13.865 1.10 13.938 1.13 13.866 1.22
Age  30.304 3.70 30.596 3.49 30.488 3.95 29.023 3.55
White  0.502 0.500 - - - - - -
Black  0.336 0.472 - - - - - -
Hispanic  0.162 0.369 - - - - - -
Professional Characteristics 
MLB Experience  7.061 3.89 7.062 3.87 7.223 4.07 6.723 3.55
MLB Experience-Squared  64.957 69.31 64.785 70.06 68.684 74.23 57.763 54.59
Tenure with Current Club  2.673 3.00 3.062 3.38 2.305 2.62 2.226 2.24
Free Agent  0.600 0.49 0.598 0.49 0.605 0.49 0.599 0.49
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration  0.296 0.46 0.304 0.46 0.294 0.46 0.271 0.45
American League  7.061 3.89 0.521 0.50 0.469 0.50 0.588 0.49
National League  0.486 0.50 0.479 0.50 0.057 0.23 0.124 0.33
Canadian Team  0.073 0.26 0.067 0.25 7.223 4.07 6.723 3.55
Performance 
At Bats  2506.414 2001.58 2419.738 1940.51 2699.202 2198.95 2375.525 1720.23
Stolen Bases  69.746 112.52 44.800 72.35 111.055 157.89 61.480 69.63
Bases on Balls  254.275 247.74 253.131 233.32 285.349 293.87 193.39 161.14
Total Bases  1060.200 913.52 1016.772 880.39 1162.845 1013.19 982.073 771.85
Slugging Average  0.407 0.06 0.404 0.06 0.416 0.06 0.397 0.07
Batting Average  0.267 0.03 0.264 0.02 0.271 0.02 0.266 0.02
Infielder  0.459 0.50 0.556 0.50 0.281 0.45 0.531 0.50
Outfielder  0.383 0.49 0.217 0.41 0.657 0.48 0.333 0.47
Catcher  0.116 0.32 0.189 0.39 0.016 0.13 0.096 0.30
Designated Hitter  0.059 0.24 0.046 0.21 0.079 0.27 0.056 0.23
Greater Metro Area Characteristics 
Percentage White  80.507 6.89 80.938 6.77 80.683 6.72 78.808 7.39
Percentage Black  13.273 6.58 12.959 6.60 13.676 6.62 13.409 6.44
Percentage Hispanic  10.621 10.65 10.719 10.80 10.331 10.58 10.918 10.36
Average Annual Income ($)  25562.990 3789.6525508.570 3757.99 25551.300 3731.59 25756.00 4016.17
Population
1  5514009 4657988 5313189 4509095 5513759 4729589 6137413 4927354
Year Dummies 
1992  0.250 0.43 0.255 0.44 0.243 0.43 0.249 0.43
1993  0.235 0.42 0.248 0.44 0.237 0.43 0.192 0.40
1997  0.260 0.44 0.248 0.43 0.270 0.44 0.277 0.45
1998  0.255 0.44 0.250 0.43 0.251 0.43 0.282 0.45
Sample Size  1093 549  367  177 
Note: 1. Population denotes the greater metro area population. 
Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Pitchers 
  All  White  Black   Hispanic  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev Mean  Std. Dev Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev 
Personal Characteristics 
Log Annual Salary  13.409 1.19 13.451 1.20 13.238 1.16 13.276 1.18
Age  29.815 4.09 30.190 4.02 29.016 4.00 27.948 4.03
White  0.782 0.41 - - - - - -
Black  0.105 0.31 - - - - - -
Hispanic  0.162 0.37 - - - - - -
Professional Characteristics 
MLB Experience  5.988 4.20 6.158 4.20 5.772 4.49 5.000 3.75
MLB Experience-Squared  53.468 76.64 55.562 78.38 53.331 75.31 38.985 63.34
Tenure with Current Club  1.924 2.07 1.935 2.10 1.843 1.97 1.926 1.99
Free Agent  0.467 0.50 0.482 0.50 0.441 0.50 0.385 0.49
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration  0.306 0.46 0.314 0.46 0.236 0.43 0.319 0.47
American League  0.513 0.50 0.518 0.50 0.543 0.50 0.452 0.50
National League  0.487 0.50 0.475 0.50 0.528 0.50 0.556 0.50
Canadian Team  0.069 0.25 0.063 0.24 0.055 0.23 0.126 0.33
Performance 
Starter  0.442 0.50 0.441 0.50 0.402 0.49 0.489 0.50
Wins  37.446 44.33 39.007 45.27 34.386 42.41 29.430 38.34
Losses  34.179 37.05 35.904 38.37 29.236 30.11 26.785 32.12
Games Started  74.12 105.53 77.769 108.53 59.646 92.16 62.274 93.98
Complete Games  10.15 22.24 10.981 23.33 6.433 14.87 7.844 19.65
Shutouts  2.875 6.08 3.065 6.32 1.984 4.74 2.385 5.35
Saves  19.488 51.87 20.941 52.93 19.362 62.60 9.474 26.16
Homeruns  56.517 62.57 58.842 64.46 50.409 52.94 46.044 56.11
Walks  225.779 249.73 231.782 257.66 224.095 217.58 185.474 217.41
Strikeouts  436.641 514.13 450.726 530.21 436.047 490.18 338.919 402.35
Innings Pitched  627.59 702.43 655.160 720.78 558.969 620.14 499.785 627.21
ERA  4.025 0.96 3.995 0.94 4.175 1.11 4.094 0.97
Strikeout Rate  0.078 0.02 0.078 0.02 0.083 0.02 0.079 0.02
Greater Metro Area Characteristics 
Percentage White  80.714 6.84 80.695 6.91 80.335 6.56 81.201 6.59
Percentage Black  13.038 6.46 12.946 6.49 14.026 6.46 12.750 6.19
Percentage Hispanic  10.975 10.77 10.899 10.61 10.909 10.40 11.573 12.20
Average Annual Income ($)  25488.2 3939.85 25491.51 3895.30 25852.23 3898.44 25122.19 4271.98
Population
1  5551948 4683875 5481401 4631793 6035905 4915887 5588930 4829139
Year Dummies 
1992  0.221 0.42 0.236 0.42 0.189 0.39 0.148 0.36
1993  0.239 0.43 .248 0.43 0.244 0.43 0.170 0.38
1997  0.264 0.44 .256 0.44 0.276 0.45 0.311 0.46
1998  0.276 0.45 .260 0.44 0.291 0.46 0.370 0.48
Sample Size  1204 942  127  135 
Note: 1. Population  denotes the greater metro area population. 
Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 
from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada 
 Table 3: Discrimination Controlling for Position Specific Productivity 
 
(1) All  
Default – White 
Pitcher 
(2) All 
Default - Black 
Pitcher 
(3) All  
Default – Hispanic 
Pitcher 
(4) All  
Default – White  
Hitter 
(5) All 
Default - Black 
Hitter 
(6) All  
Default - Hispanic 
Hitter 
 Coef  T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat Coef T-Stat 
Imputed Productivity  0.863 34.04 0.863 34.04 0.863 34.04 0.863 34.04 0.863 34.04 0.863 34.04
Race Dummies 
White Pitcher   - - 0.164 2.69 -0.005 -0.09 0.170 4.97 0.106 2.69 0.092 1.79
Black Pitcher  -0.164 -2.69 - - -0.170 -2.15 0.006 0.09 -0.058 -0.87 -0.072 -0.98
Hispanic Pitcher  0.005 0.09 0.170 2.15 - - 0.176 2.81 0.112 1.70 0.097 1.35
White Hitter  -0.170 -4.97 -0.006 -0.09 -0.176 -2.81 - - -0.064 -1.52 -0.078 -1.46
Black Hitter  -0.106 -2.69 0.058 0.87 -0.112 -1.70 0.064 1.52 - - -0.014 -0.25
Hispanic Hitter  -0.092 -1.79 0.072 0.98 -0.005 -0.09 0.078 1.46 0.014 0.25 - -
Professional Characteristics      
Age  -0.024 -3.27 -0.024 -3.27 -0.024 -3.27 -0.024 -3.27 -0.024 -3.27 -0.024 -3.27
MLB Experience  0.152 3.45 0.152 3.45 0.152 3.45 0.152 3.45 0.152 3.45 0.152 3.45
MLB Experience-Squared  -0.010 -4.79 -0.010 -4.79 -0.010 -4.79 -0.010 -4.79 -0.010 -4.79 -0.010 -4.79
Tenure  0.056 10.00 0.056 10.00 0.056 10.00 0.056 10.00 0.056 10.00 0.056 10.00
Free Agent  0.879 6.14 0.879 6.14 0.879 6.14 0.879 6.14 0.879 6.14 0.879 6.14
Final Offer Arbitration  0.471 5.94 0.471 5.94 0.471 5.94 0.471 5.94 0.471 5.94 0.471 5.94
American League  -0.006 -0.23 -0.006 -0.23 -0.006 -0.23 -0.006 -0.23 -0.006 -0.23 -0.006 -0.23
Canadian  -0.022 -0.21 -0.022 -0.21 -0.022 -0.21 -0.022 -0.21 -0.022 -0.21 -0.022 -0.21
Greater Metro Area Characteristics  
Percent White  0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34
Percent Black  0.005 1.24 0.005 1.24 0.005 1.24 0.005 1.24 0.005 1.24 0.005 1.24
Percent Hispanic  0.005 3.39 0.005 3.39 0.005 3.39 0.005 3.39 0.005 3.39 0.005 3.39
Average Annual Income  0.000 1.45 0.000 1.45 0.000 1.45 0.000 1.45 0.000 1.45 0.000 1.45
Population   0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.11
Year Dummies 
1993  0.051 1.31 0.051 1.31 0.051 1.31 0.051 1.31 0.051 1.31 0.051 1.31
1997  0.046 0.97 0.046 0.97 0.046 0.97 0.046 0.97 0.046 0.97 0.046 0.97
1998  0.130 2.44 0.130 2.44 0.130 2.44 0.130 2.44 0.130 2.44 0.130 2.44
Constant  0.994 1.63 0.830 1.37 0.100 1.65 0.824 1.34 0.888 1.44 0.902 1.48
R-Squared  0.7356 0.7356 0.7356 0.7356 0.7356 0.7356 
F-Statistic  420.83 22, 2273 420.83  22, 2273 420.83  22, 2273 420.83  22, 2273 420.83  22, 2273 420.83  22, 2273 
Root Mean Squared Error  0.61302 0.61302 0.61302 0.61302 0.61302 0.61302 





Table 4: Discrimination Controlling for Position Specific Productivity and Relative Productivity 
 
(1) 
White Pitchers / 
Black Hitters 
(2) 
White Pitchers / 
Hispanic Hitters  
(3) 
Black Pitchers / 
White Hitters 
(4) 
Black Pitchers / 
Hispanic Hitters  
(1) 
Hispanic Pitchers / 
White Hitters 
(2) 
Hispanic Pitchers / 
Black Hitters  
 Coef  T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef  T-Stat Coef T-Stat Coef  T-Stat Coef T-Stat 
Imputed Productivity  0.894 18.94 0.998 18.13 0.882 17.03 0.974 13.87 0.874 17.32 0.960 16.49
Race Dummies 
White Pitcher   0.108 2.64 0.102 1.90
Black Pitcher  -0.061 -0.92 -0.125 -1.68
Hispanic Pitcher  0.240 2.60 0.201 1.98
Relative Productivity 
White Pitcher: Black Hitter  -0.003 -0.90
White Pitcher: Hispanic Hitter  -0.013 -2.99
Black Pitcher: White Hitter  -0.018 -3.85
Black Pitcher: Hispanic Hitter  -0.018 -3.49
Hispanic Pitcher: White Hitter  0.007 0.95
Hispanic Pitcher: Black Hitter  0.003 0.50
Constant  0.804 -0.84 -0.786 -0.79 0.047 0.04 -3.335 2.03 0.596 0.53 -1.285 -0.96
R-Squared  0.7478 0.7727 0.7194 0.7837 0.7203 0.7346 
F-Statistic  322.06 19, 1288 314.29 19, 1098 127.73 19, 656 99.30 19, 284 132.23  19, 664 105.17 19, 482 
Root Mean Squared Error  0.  .60507  0.59381 0.61113 0.59296 0.61166 0.61851 
Observations  1308  1118  676 304 684 502 
Notes: 1. Other explanatory regressors were those set out in Table 3; 2. ‘Relative Productivity’ is defined as, e.g., ‘White Pitcher: Black Hitter’ = Individual White Pitcher Productivity x 
(Individual White Pitcher Productivity - Mean Black Hitter Productivity). 
 
 